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VI 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the 
totality of the facts and circumstances of the stop did not 
constitute a seizure that requires reasonable suspicion. The 
appellate court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial 
of a motion to suppress using a clearly erroneous standard and the 
conclusions of law based on those facts for correction of error. 
See State v. Brown, 853 P.3d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992). As 
clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, 
103 P. 3d 699, the reviewing court is to apply a xxnon-def erential 
review" to the "application of the law to the underlying factual 
findings in search and seizure cases." Id. at 1fl5, 103 P. 3d 699. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Appointed trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the 
record on appeal, preserved this issue by way of the Motion to 
Suppress & Memorandum and arguments set forth in the record at R. 
20-29 and in passim, et seq. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
U.S. Const. amend. VI 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves critical questions involving the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution arising out of the 
seizure and subsequent search of Ms. Hughes' person. Ms. Hughes 
was charged with Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 
third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) , and Possession of Less than 1 ounce of Marijuana, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (d) . 
After appearing for a preliminary hearing and being bound 
over, Ms. Hughes pleaded not guilty to the charges. On July 11, 
2006, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the search. Ms. 
Hughes, through appointed trial counsel, thereafter filed a Motion 
to Suppress the evidence. The State responded by filing a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The 
trial court denied the Motion. 
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Ms. Hughes subsequently appeared for a jury trial on the 
charges. At trial, appointed trial counsel renewed the Motion to 
Suppress, which the trial court again denied. At the conclusion 
of trial, the jury convicted Ms. Hughes on both counts. 
Based on the convictions, the trial court sentenced Ms. 
Hughes to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the 
Utah State Prison and 180 days, respectively, which the court 
suspended. The court then sentenced Ms. Hughes to 3 0 days home 
confinement, which was entered on March 16, 2007. On April 4, 
2007, Ms. Hughes, through appointed appellate counsel, filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are recited in detail "because the legal analysis 
in a search and seizure case is highly fact dependent." State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, \2, 78 P.3d 590 (citing State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, 1(5, 63 P.3d 650) . 
1. While on patrol at approximately 1:00 a.m., on April 9, 
2006, Deputy Davis County Sheriff Arnold Butcher1 observed three 
*At the time, Deputy Butcher was working in the Paramedics Patrol 
Division (R. 172:68:11-13) . 
3 
individuals2 walking in an intersection in Layton, Utah, appearing 
to exchange "something hand-to-hand" (R. 171:12-24).3 
2 . Deputy Butcher pulled his patrol car to the side of the 
road near to where the three individuals stood, stepped out of his 
car, and ordered Ms. Hughes and her two male companions to come 
back, asking them, " [W]hat [i]s going on"? (R. 171:26:1-3; R. 
171:8:8-9). They responded that they were walking home (R. 
171:8:13-14). 
3. Deputy Butcher asked each of them for their age and 
identification because they "appeared somewhat young" to him (R. 
171:26:16-23). 
4. Each of them provided their age but they did not have 
any identification (R. 171:26:20-25). As a result, they provided 
their names and dates of birth (Id.) . 
5. After obtaining their personal information, Deputy 
Butcher did not "run that information right away"4 but instead 
inquired whether they had any weapons without observing anything 
2Deputy Butcher initially observed the three individuals 
"probably 500 to 700 feet away" while traveling in his patrol 
vehicle" (R. 171:33-34) . 
"^According to Deputy Butcher, he first observed the three 
individuals crossing the street where pedestrians would be expected 
to cross inasmuch as there was no stoplight or crosswalk at the 
intersection (R. 171:13:4-11). 
4In fact, "several minutes" passed before Deputy Butcher ran the 
records check (R. 171:15-16). 
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that caused him to believe there were any weapons on them (R. 
171:27:8; R. 171 : 38:12-22) .5 
6. Deputy Butcher was told no (R. 171:27:8-10). He then 
asked if he could check them for weapons, to which he was told "it 
was okay go ahead" (R. 171:27:14).6 
7. After a pat down check of one of the male suspects, 
Deputy Butcher located a knife (R. 171:27:16-23). In the course 
of the pat down check, Deputy Butcher also located some finger 
scales and what appeared to be marijuana (R. 171:28-29). 
8. Deputy Butcher placed the male suspect in custody and 
called for backup (R. 171: 29:3-4) .7 
9. Deputy Clay Hawkins responded in a second patrol 
vehicle, approached Ms. Hughes, and asked her if she had any 
weapons (R. 171:41:4-6). 
10. Ms. Hughes responded by informing Deputy Hawkins that 
she had already surrendered the mini wooden bat (R. 171:41:8-9). 
Deputy Butcher confirmed later that Ms. Hughes was 26 years old, 
and that the two other individuals were ages 24 and 22 (R. 171:38:3-
11) • 
6Ms. Hughes, upon Deputy Butcher's request, responded by 
retrieving ua small little wooden mini bat" from her coat sleeve (R. 
171:29:13-24) . 
7All three of the individuals were in front of Deputy Butcher's 
patrol vehicle when he called for backup (R. 171:15:10-14). Deputy 
Butcher utilized his hand held radio to call for backup (R. 
171:15:18-19) . 
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11. Deputy Hawkins then said that he was going to pat her 
down for weapons, to which she said "no" (R. 171:41:11-12). He 
then told her that "it wasn't going to be that thorough of a 
search" (R. 171:41:13-14). 
12. In the course of that search, Deputy Hawkins located 
some marijuana in the coat pocket worn by Ms. Hughes (R. 
171:41:16-25). 
13. Ms. Hughes was then arrested for the marijuana located 
on her person (R. 171:30:3-7). 
14. Based on a subsequent records check to verify their 
names, Deputy Butcher found an outstanding warrant for Ms. Hughes 
(R. 171:30:12-16). Ms. Hughes was also purportedly arrested for 
that warrant (R. 171:30:8-19). 
15. Ms. Hughes was charged with Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and Possession of Less than 1 ounce 
of Marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(d) (R. 1-2). See R. 1-2, Information, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
16. After a preliminary hearing and being bound over, Ms. 
Hughes pleaded not guilty to the charges (R. 19). 
17. On July 11, 2006, the Court held an evidentiary hearing 
on the search (R. 18-19). 
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18. Thereafter, Ms. Hughes, through appointed trial counsel, 
filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence (R. 20-29). See R. 20-29, 
Motion to Suppress and supporting Memorandum, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
19. The State responded by filing a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R. 30-36). See R. 30-36, 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
20. The trial court denied the Motion, concluding that the 
"request for identification alone as a matter of law does not 
constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent 
encounter into a seizure." (R. 171:58-59). The court further 
concluded that the encounter "never got beyond level 1", and that 
the search "was pursuant to consent" (R. 171:59:3-5). See R. 
171:57-61, Transcript of trial court's ruling on the Motion to 
Suppress, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum D. 
21. Ms. Hughes subsequently appeared for a jury trial on the 
charges (R. 65-66) . 
22. During the course of that trial, appointed trial counsel 
renewed the Motion to Suppress, which the trial court again denied 
(R. 172:123:15-20) . 
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23. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Ms. 
Hughes on both counts (R. 118). 
24. Based on the convictions, the trial court sentenced Ms. 
Hughes to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the 
Utah State Prison and 180 days, respectively, which the court 
suspended (R. 131). The court then sentenced Ms. Hughes to 30 
days home confinement (R. 132). See R. 131-134, Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum E. 
25. On April 4, 2 0 07, Ms. Hughes, through appointed 
appellate counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 140-43). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in determining that the totality 
of the facts and circumstances of the stop did not constitute a 
seizure that requires reasonable suspicion. Deputy Butcher's 
initial request for identification alone did not constitute a 
level two stop. Nevertheless, any level one encounter escalated 
to a level two stop during Deputy Butcher's investigation. 
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, 
a reasonable person in Ms. Hughes' position would not feel free to 
just walk away by abandoning her property, let alone approaching 
Deputy Butcher to take back her property and leave. Rather, 
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Deputy Butcher's accusatory tone of voice and language, retention 
of property, pat down, and custody of her male companion 
sufficiently restrained Mr. Hughes' freedom to the point that she 
was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
In light of the facts known to Deputies Butcher and Hawkins 
at the time of the seizure, there was no reasonable articulable 
suspicion supporting the seizure of Ms. Hughes. The facts known 
to the Deputies were, at the very least, as consistent with lawful 
behavior as with the commission of a crime. In fact, the 
testimony of both the Deputies confirms as much. Hence, there 
exists no basis upon which to justify the level two stop and 
seizure of Ms. Hughes, which violated her rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
TOTALITY OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
STOP DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SEIZURE THAT REQUIRES 
REASONABLE SUSPICION, 
A. The Fundamental Right to be Free From 
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. 
Individuals under both the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution are expressly 
protected from "unreasonable searches and seizures/' U.S. Const. 
9 
amend. IV;8 Utah Const, art. I, § 14; State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967)). The right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures embodied in both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions is one of the most fundamental and cherished rights. 
See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 1611 
(1985) ("The Fourth Amendment protects . . . 'the right to be let 
alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.'") (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 
S.Ct. 1727 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete 
expression to a right of the people which is 'basic to a free 
society.'") (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend IV. 
9The Utah Constitution provides the following: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
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1359 (1949), overruled by, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 
1684 (1961))); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 
S.Ct. 1098 (1947) ("This Court has consistently asserted that the 
rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; . . . are to be regarded as of the very essence of 
constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of them is as 
important and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other 
fundamental rights of the individual citizen. . . .'") (quoting 
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921), 
overruled in part by, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294, 87 S.Ct. 1642 (1967))), overruled in part by, Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969). 
B. The Reasonableness-in-all-the-Circumstances 
Analysis Under the Fourth Amendment. 
The guiding "touchstone" of an analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment "is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances 
of the particular invasion of a citizen's personal security." 
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220, (10th Cir. 2001). 
Reasonableness accordingly depends on a balancing of the public 
interest and the individual's right to personal security free from 
arbitrary interference by law officers. See Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330 (1977) (per curiam); see 
also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 950 
11 
(2001) (stating that the Court "balance[s] the privacy-related and 
law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was 
reasonable."); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 116, 106 S.Ct. 960 
(1986) (balancing "the need to search or seize against the 
invasion whi_ch the search or seizure entails") (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). Generally, courts 
disfavor biight-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context, 
relying instead on the basic balancing test. See Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996) . Hence, no one 
factor is determinative in performing such an analysis, rather 
reasonableness is "measured m objective terms by examining the 
totality of the circumstances." Jd., 117 S.Ct. 417. 
C, The Circumstances Surrounding the Stop by 
Deputies Butcher and Hawkins Demonstrated a 
Show of Authority Sufficient to Convert the 
Stop from a Level One to a Level Two 
Encounter. 
The Fourth Amendment provides the following three different 
levels of police-citizen encounters: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
seize a person if the officer has an articulable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime . . .; (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause 
tc believe an offense had been committed or is 
being committed. 
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State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, 1fl0 n.l, 112 P.3d 507 (quoting 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)). A level one 
encounter "xis a voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond 
to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any time.'" 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f^ll, 998 P.2d 274 (citing 
State v. Jackson, 805 P. 2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and State 
v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "As long as a 
person 'remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, 
there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy 
as would under the Constitution require some particularized and 
objective justification.'" Jackson, 805 P. 2d at 767 (quoting 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 
1877 (1980) ) . 
In contrast, under a level two stop, the person is seized for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment "when the officer "xby means of 
physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the 
liberty'" of a person. Bean, 869 P.2d at 986 (quoting Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 552, 100 S. Ct. at 1876 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16 (1968)). Consequently, 
a level one encounter becomes a level two stop and "a seizure 
under the fourth amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in 
view of all the circumstances, would believe he or she is not free 
to leave." Jackson, 805 P.2d at 767. This occurs "even if the 
13 
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." 
State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 
(1979)). Some examples of circumstances indicating a seizure, 
even where the person did not attempt to leave include "xthe 
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 
by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.'" State 
v. Patefield, 927 P. 2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. At 1877). 
GeneraLly speaking, Deputy Butcher's initial request for 
identification alone did not constitute a level two stop. See 
Deitman, 739 P. 2d at 618; accord Jackson, 805 P. 2d at 768 (quoting 
United States v. Castellanos, 731 F.2d 979, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); 
Bean, 869 P.2d at 987; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
501, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion) (affirming 
permissibility of officer simply asking for and examining 
suspect's ticket and driver license). Nevertheless, any level one 
encounter escalated to a level two stop during Deputy Butcher's 
investigation. 
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Initially confronting Ms. Hughes and her two male companions 
by pulling his patrol vehicle near to where they stood on the side 
of the road, Deputy Butcher stepped out of his car and ordered 
them to come back, asking them, u [W]hat [i]s going on"? Deputy 
Butcher asked each of them for their age and identification 
because they ''appeared somewhat young" to him. They provided 
their names and dates of birth inasmuch as they did not have any 
identification. At that point, Deputy Butcher did not run a 
records check of the personal information but rather straightway 
inquired whether they had any weapons without observing anything 
that caused him to believe there were any weapons on them.10 Ms. 
Hughes, upon Deputy Butcher's request, responded by retrieving "a 
small little wooden mini bat" from her coat sleeve. Deputy 
Butcher then began checking for weapons by performing a pat down 
check of one of Ms. Hughes' male companions, during which he 
located a knife. During that pat down check, Deputy Butcher also 
located some finger scales and what appeared to be marijuana. 
Deputy Butcher then took the male companion into custody and 
called for backup. When the second uniformed deputy responded in 
another patrol vehicle, he approached Ms. Hughes and immediately 
asked her if she had any weapons. Ms. Hughes responded by 
Deputy Butcher waited "several minutes" before running the 
records check (R. 171:15-16). 
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informing hum that she had previously surrendered the mini wooden 
bat to Deputy Butcher. Nevertheless, Deputy Hawkins said that he 
was going to pat her down for weapons, to which she said "no." He 
then told her that uit wasn't going to be that thorough of a 
search." 
Taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, 
a reasonable person in Ms. Hughes' position would not feel free to 
just walk away by abandoning her property, let alone approaching 
Deputy Butcher to take back her property and leave. Rather, 
Deputy Butcher's accusatory tone of voice and language, retention 
of property,11 pat down, and custody of her male companion 
sufficiently restrained Mr. Hughes' freedom to the point that she 
was seized Eor purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
D« Lack of Reasonable Suspicion, 
"
x
 [A] level two stop . . . must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion [or it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.'"12 Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, 
uSee Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, fl4, 998 P.2d 274 
(discussing how the retention of personal items coupled with other 
factors create a show of official authority such that a reasonable 
person would not believe he or she was free to leave). 
l2,,When challenged, the [S]tate has the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative 
detention." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ^23, 164 P.3d 397 (citing 
Florida v. Foyer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-500 (1983); United States v. 
Carhee, 27 F.3d 1493, 1496 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
16 
1||H, yiJb t\ d v:n • - f 11- -1 nig <Jf:,}N-> v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah 
Ct. App. 19 94)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7 15 ("A peace 
officer may stop any per soi i :i i i a pi ib] i c pi ace when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attemptii ig to « z DI i in u t: a pi ib 1 ic offense and may 
demand, his name, address and an explanation of his actions.") . 
Although this standard is lower thai i tl le stai idar d reqi ii red for 
probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and 
circumstances approach is utilized to detennin^ il Uiere ire 
sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to support reasonable 
suspicion. Ray, 2005 UT App 55 at ^18 (citations omitted). " " Ii i 
detei m I lii if i whethei i hi i objective standard has been met, the 
focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer 
immediately before I In /il.-p "' id. (quoting State v Friesen, 
1999 UT App 262, 1|l2f 988 P.2d 7 ) . 
. ;. I i qht of tl le facts J :i IOWI I to Depi iti es Butcher and Hawkins 
at the time of the seizure, there was no reasonable articulable 
suspicion supporting the sei/.me of Ms HI MIH-S . The facts known 
to the Deputies were, at the very least, as consistent with lawful 
behavior as with the coi i imissioi I of a cr j rue In fact, the 
testimony of both the Deputies confirms as much. Hence, there 
exists no basis upon which to just i l / t he [(>y< ] tw< * " and 
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seizure of Ms. Hughes, which violated her rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Hughes respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the trial court's denial of her Motion to 
Suppress and remand the case for further proceedings consistent 
with this Court's determination. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 8th day of April, 2007 
& WIGGINS, P.C. 
fys f OT^-Ap pellant 
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CERTI EI CAXE_QE SEEYICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on this /L day of May, 2008: 
Mr. J, Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 SoutX, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114-0854 
Counsel for^TR^^Szkte of Utah 
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This Information is based on evidence obtained from witness Arnold Butcher. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
in Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Arnold 
* Butcher of the Davis County Sheriffs Office, and the information herein is based upon such 
!j5 personal observations and investigation of said officer. 
S» 1. On April 9, 2006 officers made contact with defendant and discovered that 
she was in possession of controlled substance. Defendant was taken into custody and transported 
to the Davis County Jail. 
2. During the booking process, methamphetamine was found on her person. 
Authorized April 10, 2006 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
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2550 Washington Boulevard 
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record, Dee W. Smith, and moves this < OUM U> M*ppu ^ u^ * wdence Deing use ; auiiu 
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United States-Constitution and Article I, Sections - * • -r 
'ni1 "\ supported b\ theaccompanvjnr- 'Memorandum. 
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P F F W SMITH r " 
.. ....... r,M n , - . : t. 
Motion to .Suppress 
CD19138859 
061700535 HUGHES,BRIDGET MAR4E 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress 
^ 7 day of July 2006 to 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 W State 
P O Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025 
l^gaLSeGfetary 
DEE W. SMITH #8688 of 
Attorney for Defendant 
2550 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 39lM i w i / 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
II 1 Al \U l-'OK DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
BRIDGET MARIE HUGHES, 
Deli mi in Id nit 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT O* 
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 061700535 
I Judge Dawson 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above-named in -;ui .~: H * . L 
Smith and hei eby submits the following Memoiandum in Suppou _ -H • Motion > 
Suppress. 
FACTS 
On A,pril 9, 2006, the Defendant and tw u ; 
intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drives in Layton, Utah, ai appioximah:- ? <*• * * Sgt. 
hm Iici ol in it I )a v in i * i null i >ln nil i 11 In i 
observed these three individuals. He was approximately 500 to 700 feet away from. them. 
Sgt. Bucher doesn I uxall illlinr IIKIIIJ Mlu'dlu'lil IIII mi llic nidi iilnnls 111• uir liiivelirig 
towards them. When he was approximately 200 to 500 feet away he lestified that he saw 
something "hand IO hand "" Sj;l Itiu.hn jniliiinnnl I , Ii.ii , d Howards tIM™ individuals. When 
he reached them they were near the west side of the road. 
Memorandum in Support of Motions to Suppress and < 
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Sergeant Bucher pulled over and had all three individuals come and talk to him 
They began walking away and he had them come back to where he was and talk to him He 
thought they looked young so checked to see if there was a curfew violation The Defendant 
is 26 and the two males were 22 and 24. He asked them what they were doing and they said 
they were just walking home He asked for identification and none of them had 
identification He obtained the Defendant's personal information and eventually ran a 
warrants check 
Before the warrants check was done another deputy arrived on the scene He spoke 
with the Defendant This deputy asked the Defendant if she had any weapons She pointed 
to a small bat that Sgt Bucher had already found She was asked by the deputy if he could 
search her pockets She told him no because he wasn't a female. The deputy told her it 
wouldn't be a thorough search and that it would be more of a "pat down " She said okay 
The deputy then put his hands inside her coat pockets and began searching He found 
gloves, keys, money and cigarettes in the two lower pockets As he was about to begin 
searching the upper left pocket the Defendant told him that there was some marijuana in 
there 
The deputy removed the marijuana and placed the Defendant under arrest While the 
Defendant was being searched at the jail a baggie that contained methamphetamine fell out 
of her sock Defendant has been charged with possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, and possession of a controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor 
ARGUMENT 
I THE OFFICER DIDN'T HAVE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICION TO DETAIN THE DEFENDANT 
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The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution u ..u i "ni^d States, as well a* A;:. : 1 
Section 1 1 of the Constitution of the State of I Jtah nrmide in tHevant part: ""The imht ot *:• 
people to be secure in tl leii: pet soi is. houses,, papei s ai id effects agaii ist •.. - :M ;•.*.• ;e 
searches and seizures shall not be violated,,,," Hie Courts on both the state and federal level 
1 lave define d ? I i,c: i i a seizi n e-is i n u ea soi table. 
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah, 2002), the Utah Supreme Court, defined 
ixiissible levels of seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined 
these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual 
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning 
by an officer. Since the encounter is consensual, and the person is free to 
leave, at any point there is no seizi ire within, the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment 
A level-two encounter involves' an investigative iicu 
characterized as brief and non-intrusive. Although it is a • own.. ,.*.... 
seizure, probable cause is not i equircd Rather, when ^ specific and articulable 
facts and rational inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person 
has or is committing a crime," *>•• <*nv^r may initiate an investigative 
detention without consent 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been ''charactenzeu [as 
a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause." A 
level three encounter is also a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
'I he encountei between Detendant and Sgt. Butcher was a level two stop that was not 
i!.ir: -f « '!• ountei wneie a 
citizen ,\\ •• >i ' t -\\m\ - «n;|imu'» f M, i -o -< HMVI a\ an\ tune" Stiff- v 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In contrast, a level, two stop occurs ^ hen 
a reasonable person., in v ievv of all the circumstances, woi ild believe he or she is w\\ \\ to 
Memorandum in Support... 
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leave " Id It is a level two stop "even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting 
detention brief" State v. Steward, 806 P 2d 213, 215 (UtahCt App 1991) 
A "totality of the circumstances" test should be employed to determine if a stop is a 
level two stop "There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable suspicion exists 
Rather, courts must look at the totality of the circumstances " State v. Potter, 863 P 2d 40, 43 
(Utah Ct App. 1993) An officer "must be able to point to specific facts which, considered 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion " State v. Chism, 
107P 3d706, 710(UtahCt App 2005) 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the encounter between Defendant and the 
officer was a level two stop. Sgt. Butcher ordered the Defendant and her companions to 
where he was He asked for identification He questioned them about weapons and asked 
for permission to search A second officer arrived on the scene who further questioned and 
searched the Defendant Under these circumstances a reasonable person would not feel free 
to disregard the officers instructions and walk away 
Since Sgt Butcher conducted a level two stop, he needed "specific, articulable facts 
which, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude [Defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime " State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P 2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct App 1987) 
In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion, courts should "look to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine if there was an objective basis for 
suspecting criminal activity" State v. Humphrey, 937 P 2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct App 1997) 
When considering the totality of the circumstances the officer's conduct should be judged 
"in light of common sense and ordinary human experience and we accord deference to 
Memorandum m Support 
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an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions " United States v. 
Williams, 271 F 3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir 2001) 
Reasonable suspicion must also be judged against an objective standard This Court 
must consider "whether there were specific and articulable facts known to the officer, which 
taken together with rational inferences from these facts, created a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity to justify intrusion into the defendant's personal security " State v. Fnesen, 
988 P 2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct App 1999) 
Defendant was outside late at night/early in the morning with two friends crossing 
through an intersection together when the officer spotted them from a distance of 500 to 700 
feet away The individuals continued to travel together across the intersection, When the 
officer was 200 to 300 feet away he allegedly saw a "hand to hand" encounter between two 
of the three individuals 
This allegedly occurred between three people who were walking together through a 
dark intersection Furthermore it was observed from a distance of at least 200 feet away 
This wasn't a situation where two people approached from opposite directions, made a brief 
hand-to-hand exchange and then walked away Nonetheless, the officer detained all three 
individuals His stated reason was that he wanted to check for a possible curfew violation 
However, the Defendant was twenty-six years old at the time and her companions were 
twenty-two and twenty-four None of these facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant was engaged in criminal activity "In determining whether this objective 
standard has been met, the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer 
immediately before the stop " State v. Friesen, 988 P 2d at 10 
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Citizens enjoy the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable police intrusion 
into their lives In Florida v. Royer, 460 U S 491 (1983), the Supreme Court re-affirmed 
this principle. 
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely 
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking 
him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if 
he is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution 
his voluntary answers to such questions . The person approached, 
however, need not answer any question put to him, indeed he may decline to 
listen to the questions at all and may go on his way He may not be detained 
even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so, and 
his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds. 
Id at 497-98 (Citations and quotations omitted) The Defendant attempted to exercise her 
Constitutional right to be free from an unwanted police intrusion into her life. She was 
denied this when she was ordered over to the police vehicle, questioned, ID.'d, frisked, and 
searched 
There are two cases from the Utah Court of Appeals where the Court found that 
observing a hand-to-hand exchange gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain an 
individual However, both cases are easily distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar 
The first was State v. Beach, 47 P.3d 932 (Utah Ct App 2002) In Beach, officers were in 
an area known for high drug activity They were watching a specific area that was near a 
known drug house While the officers were observing this known drug area, an officer 
observed occupants of a vehicle, which didn't have a license plate and was parked in a 
manner that obstructed traffic, make a hand-to-hand exchange with a pedestrian Id. at 935 
In State v. Singleton, 128 P 3d 28 (Utah Ct App 2005), an officer was driving 
through a trailer park that was known to law enforcement as a drug trafficking area While 
the officer was driving through the trailer park he observed two people conduct a hand-to-
Memorandum in Support 
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hand transaction as they stood near a parked vehicle The officer pulled his patrol vehicle 
behind the parked car in a manner to not block the vehicle's exit As he did this, one of the 
individuals walked to the passenger side of the vehicle while the defendant turned and 
walked toward the trailer court. The officer detained the individuals and eventually a warrant 
and controlled substances were discovered The Court of Appeals found that an observation 
of a hand-to-hand exchange in an area known for drug trafficking formed a basis for 
reasonable suspicion Id at 30-31 
The facts in the case at bar are distinguishable from the facts in the cases cited supra 
There was no evidence that the Defendant was in a high drug or crime area Furthermore, the 
facts the officer observed were not consistent with a drug deal The three individuals were 
together crossing a street The fact that the observation of the "hand to hand" was observed 
on a dark street from a distance of at least two hundred feet is contrary to finding that a 
reasonable person would conclude Defendant had committed or was about to commit a 
crime For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to suppress all evidence 
that was found following the detention of the Defendant 
CONCLUSION 
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in 
criminal activity that would justify stopping her For these reasons, the Defendant requests 
that this Court suppress all evidence that followed this unlawful stop 
DATED this ^ day of July 2006 
DEEW SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
Memorandum in Support 
State v Hughes 
Case No 061700535 
Page 7 of 8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum m 
Support to 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
P O Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
postage prepaid this day of July 2006 
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William K. McGuire, #2192 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Farmington UT 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
FAX: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIDGET MARIE HUGHES 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 061700535 
Judge: Glen R. Dawson 
The State of Utah, by and through William K. McGuire, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, hereby submits the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April, 10,2006 at 1:00 a.m., the Defendant was observed along with two other 
males by Sgt. Butcher of the Davis County Sheriffs Office. Officer Butcher recognized the time 
and was going to check for curfew violation because the individuals appeared to be under age. 
2. Officer Butcher, while driving through the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive in 
Layton, observed the Defendant and the other two males make what appeared to be a hand-to-
hand exchange. 
3. The Defendant and two males, in the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive, then 
noticed Officer Butcher and started to walk away in a very quick manner. 
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4. Officer Butcher then stopped his patrol car and asked the Defendant and two males 
what they were doing. Their reply was that they were "doing nothing" and that they were 
"walking home." 
5. Officer Butcher asked for identification and none of them had identification. Officer 
Butcher then asked for permission to do a pat down search for weapons and all the individuals 
consented to being searched. 
6. Deputy Hawkins arrived on the scene and assisted Officer Butcher with the consensual 
search. Deputy Hawkins obtained further consent from the Defendant to search her. 
7. Deputy Hawkins came to an inside pocket, whereupon, the Defendant stated that there 
"might be marijuana in there." Deputy Hawkins then removed a plastic bag with marijuana in it 
from the pocket of the Defendant. A cigarette carton was found on the Defendant which 
contained a small butt of a marijuana joint. 
8. Deputy Easton, a female officer, was requested to do a more thorough search of the 
Defendant. Deputy Easton arrived and further searched the Defendant telling her to disclose any 
other illegal substances before going to jail because if substances were taken into the jail the 
Defendant could be charged with a felony. Further searching revealed nothing. 
9. Defendant was transported to jail and searched by Sgt. Cruzy. During the booking 
process a small plastic bag fell from the Defendant's sock. Defendant attempted to conceal the 
item denying that there was anything under her foot. 




I. OFFICER BUTHCER WAS JUSTIFIED IN HIS ASKING FOR DEFENDANT'S 
IDENTIFICATION. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that officers need not have reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to ask an individual for identification. "Even when officers have no 
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; 
ask to examine the individual's identification; and request consent to search." Muehler v. Mena, 
544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 92005) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
H I S . Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389). Utah courts have taken a similar approach to requests for 
identification. See, e.g., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 618 (1987) (asking a defendant for 
identification and explanation of their presence falls within the first level of detention); State v. 
Jackson, 805 P. 2d 765, 768 (1990), ("as a matter of law, a request for identification cannot 
constitute a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure."). 
Applying the case law to the facts of this case, it is clear that Officer Butcher's stop is 
consistent with the courts own definition of a level-one stop. Here Officer Butcher noticed what 
appeared to be three young individuals out past curfew conducting a hand-to-hand exchange. 
Officer Butcher approached them to confirm or deny his suspicion. Upon his approach the 
individuals noticed him and began to walk away. After stopping them he asked for names, 
identification and age. He also asked for their consent to search them. Neither defendant nor tire 
other two could provide Officer Butcher with identification. However, they all consented to be 
searched. In Florida v.Bostick the Court stated that examining one's identification and receiving 
consent to search one's luggage does not violate the Fourth Amendment or constitute a seizure. 
3 
Officer Butcher asked for defendant's identification, age and received consent to search her for 
any weapons. Further, Office Butcher noticed what appeared to be three young individuals out 
past curfew. His approach and request for identification falls under a level-one stop even by 
Utah courts standards. State v. Detiman, 739 P.2d 616 (1987). 
II. OFFICER BUTCHER HAD REASONABLE ARTICULATE SUSPICION TO 
DETAIN THE DEFENDANT. 
Even if for the sake of argument that Officer Butcher's stop was not a level-one stop, Officer 
Butcher had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain defendant. "In determining whether . . . 
officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify Defendant's temporary detention, we 'look 
to the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting 
criminal activity.'" State v. Beach, 47 P.3d 932, 935 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). "In considering the totality of the circumstances, we 'judge the officer's conduct 
in light of common sense and ordinary human experience... and we accord deference to an officer's 
ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Id (citation omitted); State v. 
Singleton, 128 P.3d 28, 29 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). Further, officer's may "draw on their own 
experience and specialized training to make inferences from deductions about the cumulative 
information available to them that might well elude an untrained person." Singleton, at 29-30 (citing 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Finally, to establish reasonable suspicion, 
officers need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct, because the likelihood of criminal 
activity needed to establish reasonable suspicion falls considerably short of the standard known as a 
preponderance of the evidence. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273-77 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 125(2000). 
Although the determination of reasonable articulable suspicion is a fact sensitive 
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determination, Utah courts have found that it existed in cases extremely similar to the case at hand. 
First, Utah courts recognize that "nervous, evasive behavior is an important fact in determining 
reasonable suspicion" in cases of suspected drug possession or distribution. Singleton, at 30 (citing 
Wardlow, at 124-25). Likewise, Utah courts recognize that reasonable suspicion exists where 
individuals in a deserted shopping area turned their backs to police when officers drove by. IcL 
(citing U.S. v. Bull 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1977)). Further, courts recognized that a "hand-to-hand 
exchange between individuals in an area known for drug traffic [is] sufficient to constitute 
reasonable suspicion." IcL 
Applying the case law to the facts in this case, it is clear that reasonable articulable suspicion 
existed in this matter. First, Officer Butcher observed three individuals, including the defendant, 
standing in the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive. Not only did Officer Butcher notice three 
individuals in the middle of an intersection it was very early in the morning at 1:00 a.m. Further, 
Officer Butcher noticed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand contact between the individuals. After 
this initial hand-to-hand contact the defendant and the other two individuals then noticed the officer 
and began to walk away from him in a very quick manner. The facts of this case are similar to the 
recent Utah Court of Appeals case, State v. Singleton, 128 P.3d 28 (Utah App. 2005). In Singleton, 
an officer drove through a trailer park just before midnight and observed two individuals conduct a 
hand-to-hand transaction near a parked vehicle. The officer concluded that based on his training and 
experience, he had witnessed behavior consistent with an exchange of money for drugs. When the 
officer approached the individuals, they both began to walk away. The court declared that 
"unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of going about one's business." Singleton, at 30 (citing 
Wardlow at 119-120). The Court went on to state that "headlong flight ••• is the consummate act of 
5 
evasion." Id at 124. The court, using the totality of the circumstances standard, found that the hand-
to-hand exchange, the history of the area, and the evasive behavior of the defendants, was sufficient 
to provide the officer with reasonable articulable suspicion to detain the defendants. See id at 29-31. 
While the intersection of Avalon and Merlyn Drive is not considered to be a high drug trafficking 
area, the lateness of the hour, the officer's own training and experience and the evasive behavior of 
the defendant make the situation extremely suspicious. If hand-to-hand contact between two 
unknown individuals occurring in a high drug trafficking area is grounds for reasonable articulable 
suspicion, then hand-to-hand contact at a very late hour, in the middle of an intersection, coupled 
with the evasive behavior of the defendant and the officer's own training and experience is grounds 
for reasonable articulable suspicion. Thus, Officer Butcher had reasonable suspicion to stop 
defendant. 
in. CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
DATED August 7, 2006. 
/ p e ^jx^yfy^t / U u « ^ ^ 
William K. McGuire 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I certify that I mailed/delivered a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Suppress to Dee Smith, Attorney for Defendant, 2550 Washington Blvd., 
Ogden, UT 84401 on August 7, 2006. 
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1 FARMINGTON, UTAH - OCTOBER 3, 2006 
2 JUDGE GLEN R. DAWSON PRESIDING 
3 For the Plaintiff: STEVEN V. MAJOR 
4 For the Defendant: DEE W. SMITH 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Okay, counsel, will you direct me? 
7 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, the only other matters I'm 
8 aware of that I have are 7 4 and 75, Bridget Hughes. 
9 THE COURT: Do you folks want to make argument on 
10 those? I have had a chance to - I've reviewed the tape, I've 
11 reviewed your briefings, I've read a number of cases and I'm 
12 ready to make a decision but if you want more argument. 
13 MR. SMITH: I would reiterate what I briefed. If 
14 the Court has read the briefs — 
15 THE COURT: I did. I read them and I had our law 
16 clerk read them and Jessica and why don't we call those. 
17 It's State of Utah vs. Bridget Marie Hughes, 031700171, 
18 061700535. The later is the one that's set for oral 
19 argument. It's the new charge and I have reviewed everything 
20 again including watching the tape of the testimony. I note 
21 that the important facts here include the fact that there 
22 were three individuals, appeared young, were out at 
23 approximately 1:00 in the morning, potentially in violation 
24 of 11:00 p.m. curfew. The officer approached them. 
25 Apparently they started to walk away but he pulled over to 
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the side of the road and my sense is they were walk.:i i ig t : tl le 
side of the road to get. out <•- the middle of the road, asked 
them for their ages and ident. i 1 i c\it iun. They provided 1 .1 .at. 
Askod if they had any weapons, they s^id no, and then asked 
i I In i tiii Id c 1 ieck for wea.pons ai id f "• e v said yes. 
Subsequent to that, pursuant to the consent to 
search, drugs were found which counsel claims should be 
suppressed because oi the iaci ui.il I m o o \*.u> m> reason.ible 
arLiculable suspicion. 
i r * nat this never 
go1 beyonci a level 1 encountt-ji.. it'o clear from reading the 
relevant ca.so law thai request f. » i dentification, that 
d d sii' L cor;;,:, i Late a si A 
read State of Utah vs.. Mike o'Leary Dean and also Salt . ake 
CI a t ' i > ] y I Ft : i < ^  _ Ai i < i 1 : 1: i < ; y d i scuss t he d i f f e r e n c e 
betweeri a l e v e l • 1 ai id l e v e l 2 -ai id t h a t ' s r e a l l y t h e c r i t i c a l . 
question her-p i-ind at ieast. They discussed examples 
" .t- • • • < < € E ] e ;,; e 3 2 : r a sei ziire . 
;ould-be the threatening presence of•several officer,' the 
d-'-nlav of a weapon by an officer, so^p physical touching of 
- h^LSonr or the use at l&ii.]ut- -r> 
indicating that compliance w u h ! he officer's request might 
- i'*\\< I f lb if.'I .'Joe LridL in cm of f he evidence 
•before me, =.' s ci^ai in that -same case,-. i i i t.ne ..alt ._^ke 
City case I mentioned, the court indicated that request for 
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1 identification alone as a matter of law does not constitute a 
2 show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter 
3 into a seizure. In my view, this never got beyond level 1. 
4 The search was consistent - was pursuant to consent and I 
5 must deny the motion. 
6 Where would you like to go with this? 
7 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I believe she'd like to set 
8 a trial. 
9 THE COURT: You bet. I'd be glad to do that. So 
10 will it be a one-day jury trial? 
11 MR. SMITH: I think one day should be sufficient. 
12 THE COURT: Let me grab my calendar, counsel. 
13 Let' s set the matter November 9th. 
14 (Discussion of dates and other trials pending) 
15 THE COURT: I have an opportunity of December 6th -
16 or December 7th actually. Frankly, I probably wouldn't go 
17 any further into December. Juries just don't like it. I 
18 don't think they like it on either side. I mean I don't 
19 think it gives them more reason to acquit or more reason to 
20 convict. I just don't think they like it. 
21 MR. SMITH: December 7th would be fine. 
22 THE COURT: Do you want to shoot for that? 
23 MR. MAJOR: That would be fine. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Do you think I better do a 
25 waiver of a speedy trial? 
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MR. MAJOR: I think we're within the time frame. 
MR. SMITH; Yes, she'-s not i n custody. 
TI IE COURT: Ms. Hug! les is i lot in custody and has 
been very good about attending each time after the baby was 
J r: Bountj.ru i, »0b South Main Street, Courtroom \l 
is Case No. 061700535, 1-day jury trial. I meant 8:30, 
sorry. 
w ill "M be you, ? Mia j or? 
THE COURT: And Mr, Smith, Ms. Hughes is out on 
bond so that/s still in place?" The bond is still in place, 
Ms Hughes? 
MS. HUGHE;-;: Yes. 
1
 i - • -*
 :i/ r e q i i e s 1: e d v o :i i: d :i r e, 
requested urv mst. ructions musi D O filed and in my chambers 
J- Ho'iiU. Ti., one we- -ls ;dv-^-^- November ^0 l h at noo- Any 
n-r - m s mu.s . J U M n e s s Jdyi; >f 
today's date. Ai v plea negot iations must be approved by me 
a t t h e f i n a J ' p r e 1: r :i a •] w h :i c h vi :i 1 ] b e ^ • e t N o-v e nib e r 2 8 , ' T i i e s a a y 
at 2:30. So Ms. Hughes, you need to be here November 28, 
Tuesday at 2:30. Again, the ;trial is the 7th. 
? n ly o t l l e r < Drder^'fcqi ins e l y • : I / d ] it ] ;: E I : : 1 lave tl; ICE 
Court set in place from the. State? 
MR. MAJOR: No, Your Honor. 
60 
1 THE COURT: From the defense? 
2 MR. SMITH: No Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: All right counsel, we'll see you then, 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 22, 1980 
Video 
T a p e Numl < i II 0 (ifii Tape C o u n t : 3 3 9 
CHARGES 
f ILLEGAL POSS/USE Ob CONTROLLED SUBS1ANCE - jid Deyiee I el my 
Plea- Guilty Disposition: 01/18/2007 Guilty 
1 OZ MARIJUANA - Class B Misdemeanor 




Based on the defendant's conviction ot ILLEGAL POSS/USE Of 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed live years in 
the Utah State Prison 
The prison term is suspended 
JD19517503 
061700535 HUGHES.BRIDGET MAI L 
Case No: 061700535 
Date: Mar 06, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on bhe defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF < 1 OZ 
MARIJUANA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 130 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180 
day(s). 
Defendant is sentenced to serve 30 day(s) of home confinement. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The defendant is to serve 3 0 days of home confinement with AP&P 
being hooked up by 3-13-07. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 3 
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Case No: 061 7 0 0535 
Date: Mar 0 6, 2 00 7 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Tl ie fine and fee are to be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month 
beginning 04-15-07. 
COMMI JNITY SERVICE 
Complete 150 hour(s) of community service. 
Community service to be completed through Adult Probation & Parole. 
Community service is to be completed by July 33 , 2007. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendai it in i<» pay the iollowing: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE DAVIS COUNTY TREASURER 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Adult Probation 
& Parole. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The* defendant is placed on probation for 36 month (s) 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 210.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of- the law. 
ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or frequent 
places where alcohol is the chief item for sale. 
DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance i^. ^-^ ^_ 
presence of those who i ise, possess or distribute controlled 
substances. 
TESTING: Submit to h:>'i\ : . I-J^  i«- • , . • > .:--•> 4 n ug or 
alcohol- use. 
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete ah}, program, 
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P. 
SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle 
and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request 
of police or probation officer, if they have, reasonable cause. 
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or 
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Case No. 061700535 
Date Mar 06, 2007 
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement, 
No association with known drug users. 
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee 
REVIEW OF C/S is scheduled. 
Date: 08/02/2007 
Time: 02:44 p.m. 
Location: Courtroom 3 
Justice Complex 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 84 02 5 
Before Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON 
Dated this (X^ day of T ^ V ^ C - 20_67, 
^ S U — < 
GLEN R. DAWSON 
District Court 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities A6, 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary 
aids and services) should call All Holmes at 801-4$^ 
three working days prior to the proceeding. (For Tf 
Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) The general 
number is 801-447-3800. 
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